Understanding Congressional Reform: Lessons from the Seventies by Gely, Rafael & Zardkoohi, Asghar
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Summer 1998
Understanding Congressional Reform: Lessons
From the Seventies
Rafael Gely
University of Missouri School of Law, gelyr@missouri.edu
Asghar Zardkoohi
University of TexasA & M Mays Business, AZardkoohi@mays.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Election Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Understanding Congressional Reform: Lessons from the Seventies, 35 Harv. J. on Legis. 509 (1998)
ARTICLE
UNDERSTANDING CONGRESSIONAL
REFORM:
LESSONS FROM THE SEVENTIES
RAFAEL GELY*
ASGHAR ZARDKOOHI**
The effects of the procedural reforms that the House of Representatives
enacted in the early 1970s might lend insight into the possible effects of the
procedural changes enacted by the Republican Congress in 1995. While the
reforms of the 1970s and 1995 are not similar in detail, both sets of changes
increased the power of the majority leadership over its members. Profes-
sors Gely and Zardkoohi offer a model that considers the effects of 1970s
institutional changes on the voting behavior of individual members of
Congress. The authors argue that their model provides a useful frame-
work with which to assess the possible implications of the 1995 reforms.
Over the last four decades, the House of Representatives has
twice substantially changed its rules and procedures. The first
round of changes occurred in the early 1970s.1 They focused on
diminishing the role of seniority in hierarchical promotions in
the House, strengthening the role of party leadership in such
promotions, and reducing the powers of committee chairs while
at the same time increasing the powers of subcommittee chairs.
The second round of changes happened immediately after the
Republicans gained control of the House in January 1995.2 The
reforms of 1995 were similar to those of the early 1970s in
spirit, although different in detail. 3 Among the several rules in-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
**T.J. Barlow Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.
I See infra notes 16-61 and accompanying text.
2 1n 1994, after 40 years as the minority party, the Republican Party, under the
leadership of Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), took control of the House. See Jon Healey,
Jubilant GOP Strives to Keep Legislative Feet on Ground, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
3210, 3210 (Nov. 12, 1994). Republicans had called for changes in the way the House
in general, and the committee system in particular, operated for many years before
taking over the House in November 1994. Once elected, but before taking office in
January 1995, the Republican leaders gathered support for changing major aspects of
House procedural rules. See Janet Hook, New Congress Poised to Turn Tradition on
Its Head, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3591, 3592 (Dec. 31, 1994).
3 In addition to the policy changes that Republicans had promised to introduce if they
held the majority, they also promised to incorporate a number of significant changes
in the rules that control the inner workings of the House. See Healey, supra note 2, at
3211. The proposed rules changes would affect the committee system, term limits, floor
procedures, and various others administrative functions of the House. See Rules
Changes Open the Process... But Strengthen the Reins of Power, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY.
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troduced were a reduction in the number of committees and
subcommittees and the imposition of term limits for committee
and subcommittee chairs and the Speaker.4
An important similarity between the two sets of reforms is the
increase in the power of majority party leadership over its mem-
bers. The reforms of the early 1970s reduced the role of seniority
in promotional decisions and increased the role of party leader-
ship.5 They also substantially increased the number of subcommit-
tees and eliminated multiple chairmanship of subcommittees so
that there could be a greater number of junior representatives
eligible for chairmanship than ever before.6 Similarly, the 1995
REP. 13, 14-15 (Jan. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Reins of Power]. With respect to floor
procedures, the new rules establish a requirement for a three-fifths majority of voting
members to pass any bill, amendment, or conference report containing an increase in
income tax rates, prevent the enactment of retroactive tax increases and the considera-
tion of commemorative legislation, and require roll call votes for certain appropriations
bills. See id. at 15. In terms of administrative House functions, the rules eliminate the
Office of the Doorkeeper and create the new position of Chief Administrative Officer.
See id. The Republicans introduced some major initiatives with respect to the workings
of the committee system. Various committees were abolished and their jurisdictions
divided among remaining committees. Three committees suffered this fate: District of
Columbia, Merchant, Marine and Fisheries, and Post Office and Civil Service. See id.
at 14. The new rules limit the number of staff that both committees and subcommittees
can hire, and centralize the hiring of staff in the hands of the committee chairs. See
id. The rules impose various procedural limitations, such as prohibiting proxy voting-
the practice of allowing a committee chair or other designee to cast an absent member's
vote in committee. See id. The rules also prohibit the practice of rolling quorums, by
which committee chairs were able to hold open a vote in committee indefinitely,
allowing members to show up at their convenience to vote. See id. Finally, the rules
require committee and subcommittee meetings to be open to the public, except when
an open meeting would endanger national security, compromise sensitive information,
or possibly degrade, defame, or incriminate any person. See id.
4 Under the new rules, with three exceptions, no committee is allowed more than five
subcommittees. The three exceptions are: Appropriations, which is allowed 13 subcom-
mittees, Government Reform and Oversight, with seven subcommittees, and Transpor-
tation and Infrastructure, with six subcommittees. See Reins of Power, supra note 3.
This rule is interesting for two reasons. First, this recent change allegedly aims to
decentralize and streamline the committee structure, which Republican leaders argued
had become bloated over the past two decades. Paradoxically, the problem to which
Republicans responded originated with the rules changes of the early 1970s, enacted
under pressure from freshman Democrats seeking to decentralize committee power. In
1974, the House adopted a rule requiring that any committee with more than 20
members have at least 4 subcommittees. Second, the rules enacted and supported by
the new class of freshman Republicans appear to undermine the self-interest of these
junior members, as well as the interests of the Republican leaders. By limiting the
number of subcommittees, the rule limits the number of chair positions available for
distribution among committee members. The allocation of committee and subcommittee
chairs has been used since the 1970s as a control and reward mechanism by party
leaders in the House. To the extent that fewer of these positions are available, the
leaders lose some leverage over the individual representatives, while the junior repre-
sentatives face reduced opportunities to become chairs.
5 See infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
6 See id.
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reforms were clearly designed to centralize power in the Speaker
to implement the Republican's Contract With America agenda.7
Although the numbers of subcommittees and committees were
reduced, the introduction of term limits (a three-term maximum)
for the chairs is expected to increase the opportunity for junior
members to become chairs sooner and more frequently.8
For the purposes of this Article, an important implication of
the two sets of reforms is that party leadership has become a
more binding constraint on a representative's promotional ambi-
tions.9
7 The new rules were part of a larger plan crafted by Speaker Gingrich to centralize
power in the Republican leadership of the House. See David S. Cloud, Shakeup Time,
53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 9, 9-10 (Supp. Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Shakeup]. The
purpose of the plan was to facilitate enactment of the Republicans' legislative agenda,
described as their "Contract With America." The Contract With America included 10
major policy items which the Republicans promised to bring for a vote during the first
100 days of the 104th Congress. See Republicans' Initial Promise: 100-Day Debate on
'Contract,' 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3216, 3216 (Nov. 12, 1994).
8 On the one hand, these rules, in conjunction with the term limits rule, should
accelerate the rate at which chairs turn over, creating more opportunities for junior
members to ascend to power sooner in their careers. On the other hand, limiting the
number of subcommittees and limiting congressional staff should create an immediate
incentive problem, as it makes it more difficult to place junior representatives in
positions of power immediately or to reward them with more resources. Which of these
effects will dominate is clearly an open question.
9 These developments beg the question of what substitute form of control the
Republican leadership uses to maintain party unity. The answer seems to be threefold:
the imposition of term limits for committee and subcommittee chairs, the Contract With
America, and Speaker Gingrich himself.
A major component of the rule changes was the imposition of term limits for
committee and subcommittee chairs. Under the new rules, committee and subcommittee
chairs may hold their positions for no more than three consecutive terms. See Reins of
Power, supra note 3, at 15. Such term limits could potentially balance the rule limiting
the number of subcommittees. Although the leadership will not have as many subcom-
mittees to distribute among loyal followers, those positions that exist will be up for
allocation more frequently. See David S. Cloud, GOP, to Its Own Delight, Enacts House
Rules Changes, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 13, 13 (Jan. 7, 1995).
A second lever of control used by Republican leaders has been the Contract With
America. As one observer has commented:
During the first 100 days, a preprinted program could tell you not only who
the players were in Congress, but what they were doing. All you had to do
was follow the House Republicans' campaign manifesto known as the "Con-
tract With America." It accurately scripted the House agenda and likely
outcome.
Jeffrey L. Katz, GOP Faces Unknown Terrain Without 'Contract' Map, 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 979, 979 (Apr. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Unknown Terrain]. By committing
Republican candidates to a simple "contract," the Republican leadership in Congress
was able to control not only the agenda of the first 100 days, but also the behavior of
party members. See Carrol J. Doherty, Time and Tax Cuts Will Test GOP Freshman
Solidarity, 53 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 915, 916 (Apr. 1, 1995).
Finally, the figure of the Speaker and the party leadership became mechanisms of
control. Committee chairs were put on notice that, at least during the first 100 days,
the leadership would exercise complete control and demand complete loyalty. See
Shakeup, supra note 7, at 9. Speaker Gingrich himself made it clear that he intended
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The purpose of this Article is to examine voting behavior of
representatives when faced with dual constraints (constituents
back home and the leadership) as compared to one constraint
(constituents back home).10 An ambitious goal of the study would
have been to examine the effects of both sets of reforms. How-
ever, there are two reasons for not using the 1995 reforms in our
empirical examinations. First, not enough time has passed to
fully observe the effect of term limits on voting behavior." Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the leadership, whose power it was
to impose a constraint on a representative's promotional oppor-
tunities, lost power (due to ethical issues surrounding the Speaker)
soon after implementing the reforms.12
to keep tight control over the work of the committees by hand-picking the chairs of
three major subcommittees, disregarding seniority, and using his conservative ideology
as the criterion of selection. See id. at 10. The three committees were Appropriations,
Energy and Commerce, and the Judiciary. See Karen Foerstel, Gingrich Flexes His
Powers in Picking Panel Chiefs, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3326, 3326 (Nov. 19, 1994).
In making appointments to coveted committees, the Speaker and the party leadership
sought to reward freshmen members, especially those they believed electorally vulner-
able in the next round of elections. Several seats on the Appropriations Committee were
given to freshmen from traditionally Democratic districts who were expected to face
tough races. For example, George Nethercutt (R-Wash.), who had beaten former House
Speaker Thomas Foley, was appointed to the Appropriations Committee. See Jonathan
D. Salant, New Chairmen Swing to Right; Freshmen Get Choice Posts, 52 CONG. Q.
WKLy. REP. 3493, 3494 (Dec. 10, 1994). The message clearly resonated with Rep.
Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), who won a congressional seat that had been occupied by a
Democrat for over fifty years and who was appointed to the coveted Appropriations
Committee: "My selection to the Appropriations Committee makes a statement to other
Southern districts where Democrats are in office that we need not fear losing all our
influence by voting for a conservative Republican" Id.
10 See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
IThere is no clear consensus about the implications of the recent changes. While
the impact of some of the new rules was immediately felt (e.g., the rule preventing
voting by proxy in committees), the effects of other rules have yet to be felt (e.g., the
imposition of term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs). Even though three
years have passed since the enactment of these rules, it is still too early to conduct an
empirical evaluation of their ramifications. Because the changes mirror those of the
1970s to an astonishing extent, we can survey that earlier period to help gauge the
likely effects of the more recent revolution. This Article attempts this by developing
and empirically testing a framework for congressional voting behavior that focuses on
the context of the individual representative's congressional career.
12By most accounts, the efforts of the Speaker, at least initially, were highly
successful. See Janet Hook, Republicans Vote in Lock Step, But Unity May Not Last
Long, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 495, 495 (Feb. 18, 1995). The Republican majority
kept very close ranks during the first 100 days of the 104th Congress. See Unknown
Terrain, supra note 9, at 979. The Speaker was able to control voting behavior of party
members, as well as the agenda of committee chairs. The House leadership was also
able to elicit specific outcomes from the committees, despite initial opposition by some
committee chairs. Shortly after becoming House Speaker, however, Rep. Gingrich faced
disciplinary hearings over ethical violations that have rendered him highly ineffective.
See Jennifer Babson, Ethics Reviews GOPAC, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3323, 3323(Nov. 19, 1994) (describing the investigation by the House Ethics Committee into the
activities of the political action group headed by the Speaker).
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Part I presents a theoretical framework that identifies voting
behavior in the form of investment. The role of tenure and the
changes in the rules of the House during the early 1970s are
explained and specific investment hypotheses derived. Part II
presents the empirical test of our theoretical framework. Part III
discusses the implications of our findings with respect to the
recent rules changes.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
While the two major reforms of the House rules were sepa-
rated by over two decades, they both raise a very similar ana-
lytical issue: the effect on the representative's voting behavior
of the constraints imposed simultaneously by the constituents
back home and party leaders in Congress. 3 Political scientists
13 Of course, numerous other aspects of congressional voting have been identified in
the political science literature on congressional voting behavior. For example, it is well
established that the length of service in Congress is an important determinant of voting
behavior. See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN
THEIR DISTRICTS (1978) (arguing that seniority in Congress influences the various
"home styles" of members). It has also been argued that newly elected representatives
have different concerns and priorities than their more senior colleagues. The differences
are reflected in their use of resources, their home styles, and their voting behavior. See
Jon R. Bond, Dimensions of District Attention Over Time, 29 AM. J. POL. ScI. 330,
334 (1985) (arguing that senior members of Congress pay less attention to their
districts than junior members); Albert D. Cover, Contacting Congressional Constitu-
ents: Some Patterns of Perquisite Use, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 125, 129-30 (1980) (finding
that senior members of Congress are less likely than junior members to send mass
mailings to their constituencies). An intriguing dimension of the years-of-service
literature is the so-called "last period" problem. See generally David N. Figlio, The
Effect of Retirement on Political Shirking: Evidence from Congressional Voting, 23
PUB. FIN. Q. 226 (1995); James R. VanBeek, Does the Decision to Retire Increase the
Amount of Political Shirking?, 19 PUB. FIN. Q. 444 (1991) (arguing that removing
threat of re-election does not affect how congressmen vote whenver they do vote); Mark
A. Zupan, The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not
Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?, 65 PUB. CHOICE 167
(1990) (arguing that retiring House members shirk their constituents' interests more
after deciding to retire, but their amount of shirking does not vary widely from the
amount of shirking undertaken by the average nonretirer). Do members of Congress
who have no intention to run for re-election change their voting behavior in their last
term because they are no longer subject to a re-election constraint? The last period
problem indicates that an important dimension of the representative's voting behavior
is his or her congressional career. If voting behavior changes in the representative's
last period in Congress, might similar changes occur at other points in the repre-
sentative's career? If so, what factors trigger those changes?
Another issue analyzed in the literature on congressional voting patterns is the effect
of safety margins on voting behavior. Safety margins are a measure of how secure the
incumbent is against an election challenge. See Gary C. Jacobson, Deficit-Cutting
Politics and Congressional Elections, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 375, 382, 399 (1993) (explain-
ing congressional votes on deficit reduction bills on the basis of safety margins)
[hereinafter Deficit Politics]; see also Gary C. Jacobson, Running Scared: Elections
HeinOnline  -- 35 Harv. J. on Legis. 513 1998
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 35
have noted that there exists a potential conflict between constitu-
ency and party.14 In particular, it has been argued that members
of Congress sometimes face conflicts when forced to decide
issues in which the preferences of their constituents and their
leaders differ.15 A relatively unexplored aspect of the multiple con-
straints problem is the effect that different constraints have at
different periods in a legislator's career. Prior research has as-
sumed that the constraints placed on the legislator have similar
effects throughout.16 In this Article, we argue that the effect that
constituents and party leaders play in the legislator's voting cal-
culus varies over time.
In this Section, we develop a theory of congressional voting
behavior through a model of investment that characterizes voting
behavior longitudinally. The expected return on the legislator's
investment accrues in the form of advancement within the con-
gressional hierarchy. A higher position is expected to result in
benefits for the legislator and her constituency. We treat tenure
as a non-linear factor disjointed at two important points of time
in a representative's career. We examine the effects of safety
margins and multiple constraints on voting behavior during the
three distinct periods in a representative's career.
and Congressional Politics in the 1980s, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 39, 55(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (explaining that campaign
spending is influenced by subjective electoral safety margins) [hereinafter Jacobson,
Running Scared]; THOMAS E. MANN, UNSAFE AT ANY MARGIN: INTERPRETING CON-
GRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 102-03 (1978) (arguing that worst-case scenarios give incum-
bents insecure sense that their seats are unsafe at any electoral margin). While there is
dispute as to whether there is safety at any margin, a relationship seems to exist
between voting behavior and the constituency's interests. An aspect of the question of
safety margins that remains mostly unexplored is the interaction between safety
margins' and years of service. While there has been some attention to the effect of
increased tenure on safety margins, see generally John R. Alford & John R. Hibbing,
Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House, 43 J. POL. 1042 (1981) (arguing that
the relatively uniform increase in incumbency advance across tenure levels, as well as
the sudden mid-1960s shift in advantage, is inexplanable), little or no attention has
been given to the effect of safety margins at different periods in the representative's
career.14 See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 117 (2d ed. 1981).
15See id. at 116-18. Kingdon shows that different groups of legislators handle this
conflict in different ways. He concludes that Northern Democrats, for instance, tend to
vote overwhelmingly with their constituencies and against the party leadership, while
Southern Democrats split quite evenly between voting with their constituencies and
with their committee chairman. See id. at 118.
16See, e.g., id.
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A. The Players
In a recent article on the politics of deficit-cutting, Professor
Gary Jacobson characterizes the legislator's decision as influenced
by both the voters' ratings of the legislator's performance and
the preferences of her party leaders. 17 Following Professor Ja-
cobson's basic proposal, we model the behavior of a legislator
as influenced by two distinct constraints, one external to Con-
gress and one internal. The external constraint is the legislator's
constituency back home. Research has traditionally established
that legislators are expected to maximize the probability of re-
election through their voting behavior by considering the wishes
of their constituents. 18
The legislator's internal constraint is her party leadership in
Congress. The reason we model leaders as a constraint derives
from the hierarchical structure of Congress. Party leaders are in
a position of power in at least two respects. First, the support
of party leaders is likely needed for the passage of legislation.19
Second, party leaders can sanction dissident members, by influenc-
ing the committee assignment process. 20 To the extent that com-
mittee assignments and legislation have value to an individual
legislator, the positions party leaders take on various bills im-
pose a constraint on the voting behavior of the legislator.
It is this trichotomy of interests, those of the leaders, the
constituency, and the legislator, that motivates the investment
framework. We define an "investment vote" as one which the
legislator casts in favor of the party leadership position on an
issue when it is against the immediate interest (but not neces-
sarily the long-run interest) of the constituency. We define a
''reverse investment vote" as one which the legislator casts in
favor of the constituency when it is against the position of the
leadership. When the interests of the leaders and the constitu-
ency are in tandem, the legislator is expected to vote in favor of
those interests and no investment or reverse investment occurs.
17 See Deficit Politics, supra note 13, at 377.
18 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962) (arguing that in an economic theory of constitutions, any single
individual might be able to adopt rules for collective decision-making that would
satisfy his own interest).
19 See David C. Coker & Mark W. Crain, Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Gener-
ating Institutions, 81 PUB. CHOICE 195, 199 (1994).
20 See KINGDON, supra note 14.
1998]
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What motivates an investment vote? If a legislator votes with
the leadership, that legislator gains the support of the leaders,
and thus enhances certain aspects of her political career. On the
other hand such behavior might risk alienating the legislator's
constituency, whose support is necessary for re-election.
Traditionally, situations characterized by these conflicts of in-
terest have been explained using the concept of shirking, or
consumption, on the part of the legislator.2' That is, the legislator
is seen as deviating from the constituency's interests and voting
instead to satisfy his or her own ideology.22 The concept of
investment, however, implies that when the interests of leaders
and constituents are in conflict, there is an optimal strategy that
the legislator can follow to maximize total support from both
groups.
This optimal strategy depends foremost on the constituents'
electoral considerations.2 3 Professor Jacobson identifies five de-
cision rules that voters use in deciding which candidate to sup-
port in congressional elections.2 4 According to Professor Jacob-
son, voters may decide on the basis of the political parties'
positions on policy issues; the candidates' positions on policy
issues; the president's party's performance in office; the incum-
bent's performance in office; and Congress's performance .25 The
incumbent's performance criterion is based on the idea that vot-
ers choose between candidates by deciding whether the incum-
bent must be rewarded or punished for his or her contribution to
outcomes.26 Aware of this criterion, legislators normally try to
communicate to their constituents both their position or seniority
within the congressional hierarchy and the resulting benefits that
constituents derive from their member's status in Congress .2 A
portion of a speech by a senior representative participating in
Professor Fenno's home style study is illustrative: "I have rep-
resented this district for the last twenty years. And I come to
21 See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators: Testing for Principal Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON.
103, 105 (1990); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the
Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 282-84 (1984) [hereinafter Kalt
& Zupan, Capture and Ideology].22See Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology, supra note 21, at 282.
23 See Deficit Politics, supra note 13, at 376.24 See id. at 376-77.
25 See id. See also R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 44
(1990).
26 See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 44.
27See FENNO supra note 13, at 137-38.
[Vol. 35
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you to ask for a two-year renewal of my contract. I'm running
because I have a twenty-year investment in my job and because
I think you, as my constituents, have an investment in my sen-
iority.?2
The assertion that voters evaluate an incumbent's performance
in part by considering his or her congressional status,29 suggests
that voters are willing to trade off an investment vote cast by
their representative for an expected marginal gain associated
with the representative's power in Congress. A rational constitu-
ent (with a relatively low discount rate) would understand that
if the representative voted against the constituent's immediate
interests, the legislator might be making an investment with the
party leadership. The investment is expected to accrue otherwise
unavailable benefits in the future. In other words, the constituent
might like the legislator to cast investment votes for a period of
time if that facilitates promotion to a committee important to the
constituent's interests.30 Whether an investment vote is cast, how-
ever, depends on the factors affecting the market (demand and
supply) for such a vote.
B. The Market for Investment Votes
In this section we discuss factors that affect the supply of and
the demand for investment voting, in other words, the investment
voting market. We describe the development of that market, and
identify the three factors we expect to affect the supply of and
demand for investment votes: tenure, safety margins, and the
representative's political ideology relative to the party leader-
ship. We show that major reforms in Congress between the late
1960s and the early 1970s created a supply of and a demand for
investment votes. Below we discuss these reforms and then ex-
amine their effect on investment voting behavior.
1. The 1970s Reforms
As a group the reforms were intended to: (1) diminish the role
of seniority in obtaining promotions; (2) strengthen the role of
281d. at 138 (emphasis added).
29 See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 45-46.
30As discussed immediately below, tenure in Congress affects the extent and the
timing of a legislator's investment. See infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
1998] 517
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the party leadership; and (3) reduce the powers of committee
chairmen and increase the power of subcommittee chairmen.3'
a. The changing role of seniority In 1970, the Democratic Cau-
cus Committee on Organization, Study and Review (the Hansen com-
mittee) substantially changed the rules concerning the seniority sys-
tem. 32 It was established that upon demand from ten members the
Caucus had to vote on-the appointment of any committee chairman.33
This rule allowed the members of the Democratic party, for the first
time, to circumvent the seniority system in the appointment of chairs
to the standing committees.34
b. The changing role of party leadership. Party leadership was
strengthened through changes in control over policy matters. For ex-
ample, in 1973, the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee
was created to serve as "a leadership forum for considering and push-
ing party policy positions" and made recommendations regarding leg-
islative priorities and scheduling of matters for House or Caucus ac-
tion.35 The composition of the twenty-four member Steering Committee
included twelve members elected by all Democratic representatives;
the other twelve members included the three elected party leaders
(Speaker, majority leader, and Caucus chair), the majority whip, four
deputy whips, and four others appointed by the Speaker.36 Thus, half
of the votes in the powerful Steering Committee were controlled by
the Speaker and his appointees.
A second important reform concerning the party leadership
relates to the authority of the Rules Committee. The reforms
concerning the Rules Committee were twofold.37 First, the re-
forms allowed the Speaker to bypass the Rules Committee, if the
Committee refused to grant a rule within twenty-one days from
the date the bill was favorably reported out of the originating
31 See David W. Rohde, Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the
Subcommittee Bill of Rights, 411 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 39, 42, 47
(1974).
32 See id. at 42.
33 See id.
34In 1973, reformers proposed the requirement of an automatic vote for each
committee chair. This proposal was rejected, and in its place a 20% rule was adopted,
under which a secret ballot vote was required if 20% of the Caucus members demanded
it. See id. at 43.
35See STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS
45-47 (1984).
36 See LEROY N. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES 56 (1977).37 See Rohde, supra note 31, at 40.
[Vol. 35
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committee.38 Second, the membership of the Rules Committee
was enlarged from twelve to fifteen members in order to obtain
a reform-favoring majority. 9 Also, the Speaker was given the
right, with the approval of the Caucus, to appoint the Chairman
and the members (from his own party) of the Rules Committee. n0
Although the question of the effectiveness of these reforms
has been the subject of considerable debate,41 it is clear that the
reforms influenced several determinants of the legislators' voting
behavior.42 The reforms then broke the monopoly power that the
committee chairs had over policy matters and distributed this
power among party leadership and subcommittee chairs, who
were generally more junior members of Congress. 43
c. The changing role of subcommittee chairs. As part of the
Hansen committee report, reforms also increased the power of sub-
committee chairs. First, the report recommended that the number of
subcommittee chairs a member could hold be limited to one.44 The
immediate effect of this rule was to hand subcommittee chair positions
to relatively junior representatives who otherwise would have had to
wait several years before acquiring such positions.45
In 1973, the Democratic Caucus approved the Subcommittee
Bill of Rights.46 The Bill of Rights introduced several major
changes. First, the limits of subcommittee jurisdiction were iden-
tified and fixed, and legislation was required to be referred to
38See id.39 See id.
40 See SMITH & DEERING, supra note 35, at 47, 92.
41 See generally RIESELBACH, supra note 36 (arguing that the reforms advanced
neither a useful mix of a responsible and responsive Congress nor a balance between
the needs for deliberation and decisiveness).
42For example, Professor Rohde argues:
Clearly, by making committee chairmen dependent for their position on the
acquiescence of the Caucus and by affording protections in Caucus and
committee rules for subcommittee chairmen and committee members, the
powers of the committee chairmen have been reduced. Again, the potential for
stronger influence by the Democratic leadership appears to have been created.
If the leadership desires a particular outcome, the committee chairmen are less
capable of blocking it, and the newly strengthened subcommittee chairmen
would seem less likely to resist.
Rohde, supra note 31, at 47.
43 The powers of the committee chairmen had already been modified in the Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1970. The Act made committee affairs more open to the
public by allowing, among other things, public broadcasts of committee hearings and
by requiring that roll calls in committee be made public. See Rohde, supra note 31, at
41.
44 See id. at 42.45 See id.46See id. at 44.
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the appropriate subcommittee within two weeks from the date
the legislation was referred to the committee. 47 This rule sought
to prevent the chair from unilaterally deciding which subcom-
mittee would work on a given bill. Second, the Bill of Rights
authorized subcommittees to hold hearings, receive evidence,
and have an adequate budget and staff.48 Finally, the bill re-
formed the bidding process for subcommittee chairs, making it
more responsive to the committee caucuses. 49
These reforms effectively created a market for the exchange
of political power. By diminishing the pervasiveness of the sen-
iority system, and thus making committee and subcommittee
chairs open to electoral challenge, and by giving the leadership
appointment and agenda powers, the reforms motivated members
who wished to obtain benefits through the leadership to endow
party leaders in Congress with a supply of investment votes. The
reforms also created a demand for investment votes on the part
of the leadership. Given that power was distributed to a rela-
tively large number of less senior members, successful policy
changes could require the support of these junior members. Be-
low we demonstrate how the reforms created a supply of and a
demand for investment votes.
2. Supply Factors
The change in the seniority system induced by the reforms
was an important aspect of the supply effect. Although repre-
sentatives still had to appeal to their constituents to get re-
elected, they could no longer rely solely on seniority as a con-
sideration for promotion to higher positions in Congress. Instead,
legislators had to appeal to a new constraint, the congressional
leadership. We assert that the evolution of leadership as an im-
portant constraint created a trade-off for some representatives. Rep-
resentatives whose constituents had views different from those of
the leadership had to trade one set of benefits-those anticipated
to be obtained from the leadership-for another set of benefits-
those anticipated to be obtained from the constituents. Thus,
after the reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s, repre-
47 See id. An exception to the two-week rule occurred when a majority of Democratic
members of the committee voted to consider a measure in the full committee.48 See id.
49 See id.
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sentatives who faced constituents with different preferences than
those of the party were in a position to participate in the market
for investment votes. The political preferences of the constituents
relative to the party leaders became a factor to which representatives
had to pay attention when casting their votes.
In addition to the importance that constituent preferences relative
to those of the leadership obtained in the post-reform period, we
assert that a major intervening determinant of the occurrence of
investment and reverse investment is the representative's tenure.
Tenure, we argue, affects the legislator's voting behavior by
affecting the cost of, or the risk associated with, casting an
investment vote, i.e., disagreeing with the constituency. This
may imply that tenure influences the timing of investment be-
havior.
A newly elected representative might be at a higher risk of
losing her re-election than a representative who has been in
Congress for several years. This derives from two related factors.
First, the legislator's ability to obtain electoral resources in-
creases with more tenure. Second, establishing credibility takes
time. We expect that when a newly elected representative votes
against her constituency, her constituents might not perceive
such a vote as an investment. Moreover, newly elected repre-
sentatives are not in an immediate position to be promoted to an
important committee, even if they vote in favor of leadership and
against the interest of their constituents. Once these junior leg-
islators establish credibility with their constituency, however, a
vote against the immediate interest of the constituency is more
likely to be perceived as an investment vote. This analysis sug-
gests that the supply of investment votes is not expected from
"junior" representatives.
At the other end of the tenure line are legislators who have
served in Congress for a relatively long period of time. Unlike
their more junior counterparts, we should expect that senior
members are somewhat more secure in their chances for re-elec-
tion.50 There might be several reasons for this. First, most senior
legislators have already achieved positions of power.51 To the
50 For example, research shows that for the period 1948-1978, the average proportion
of the votes cast in favor of non-Southern House incumbents increased with tenure,
although at a diminishing rate. See Alford & Hibbing, supra note 13, at 1046-47.
51 For example, in 1974, about 86% of the Democrats in the House with at least 18
years of experience (56 in total) had achieved positions of chairman. Of these, 33%
chaired committees and 53% chaired subcommittees. These figures were calculated
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extent that voters value this trait, they will be more likely to
support the candidate. Second, senior members in positions of
power enjoy the full advantages of incumbency: ability to raise
money, access to the media, and use of congressional resources.52
The advantages of incumbency can scare off strong challengers,
further reassuring the likelihood of winning for the senior in-
cumbent.53
While senior members are, on average, less likely than junior
legislators to be defeated in their quest for re-election, there is
little incentive for them to supply investment votes. These senior
members are likely to be either leaders themselves, or hold
positions in the congressional hierarchy important to their con-
stituents.5 4 This implies that the leadership constraint is no longer
binding; the only constraint facing the senior members is their
constituency.
There are the representatives, however, who are neither junior
nor senior. It is this group of legislators that has the strongest
incentive to supply investment votes. These legislators have enough
tenure to have established a credible reputation with their con-
stituents and therefore are not at as great a risk of losing a
re-election campaign as a result of casting an investment vote as
their junior counterparts. This group of representatives is most
likely to benefit from investment votes, as they are on the margin
of being chosen by the present leadership to chair subcommittee
positions. They simply have the most to gain from investment
behavior.
Viewed from the leadership position, our theory seems to sug-
gest that these members have vacillating loyalties. In other
words, it might appear that party leaders are being "fooled" by
members who vote with the leadership only when it is time for
promotion. Ideally, party leaders would prefer total loyalty from
party members.5 5 A legislator who decides to vote against the
party leaders' preferences might risk political alienation. 56
using data from CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE 1789
(2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MEMBERS].52See generally Jacobson, Running Scared, supra note 13, at 54-55 (explaining how
incumbents utilize their office to conduct a perpetual campaign).53 See id. at 55.54 See, e.g., SMITH & DEERING, supra note 35, at 172 (stating that seniority is still
the primary determinant of accession to a committee or subcommittee leadership
position).55 See Jacobson, Running Scared, supra note 13, at 73-76.56 See id.
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Party leaders, however, also operate in a constrained environ-
ment.57 For example, liberal party leaders who demand complete
loyalty from legislators who represent more conservative dis-
tricts might risk losing the district to the opposing party.58 Party
leaders' demand for loyalty from party members is constrained
by the political preferences of the members' constituents. Our
theory suggests that party leaders recognize that it is only during
the middle years of legislative careers that they might be able
to command the loyalty of these members.
A moderating factor that affects the supply of investment
votes is the legislator's margin of re-election safety.59 A legisla-
tor's willingness to cast an investment vote is constrained by his
or her chances of re-election. Since an investment vote repre-
sents a vote against the immediate interest of the constituents, a
legislator with a narrow margin of safety might be less likely to
cast such a vote.60
While the safety margin has been incorporated in prior re-
search on congressional voting, little attention has been paid to
the interaction of safety and tenure. We believe that while safety
margins matter, they matter most within the context of the con-
gressional career. A junior legislator with a high safety margin
will be unlikely to cast an investment vote until she has devel-
oped a reputation with her constituents that allow her to do so.
The more trust the legislator is able to instill in her constituency,
the more leeway she will have to diverge from the desires of her
district when voting in Washington. 61 This, we argue, is likely
to occur at some later point in the representative's career. At this
later point, the representative is better positioned to exchange
investment votes for a promotion to a desired subcommittee
chair.
In sum, our model predicts that (i) "very junior" and "very
senior" representatives on average will be less likely to supply
investment votes, (ii) representatives in the middle of their ca-
reers will be more likely to supply investment votes, and (iii) a
moderating factor for an investment vote is the reelection safety
margin.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 40-44.60 See id.
61 See FENNO, supra note 13, at 151-52.
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3. Demand Factors
The reforms had a major effect on creating the demand (i.e.,
the willingness and ability to pay) for investment votes. Before
the reforms, the party leadership had few resources with which
to pay for an investment vote. Promotions were generally based
on seniority. The near inability of party leaders to pay for an
investment vote implied no demand for such votes.62 Likewise,
as investment votes are inherently costly, since they are by defini-
tion votes against the immediate interest of the constituents, a
zero price would not have motivated their supply.
The breakdown of the near monopoly power of the committee
chairs and the consolidation and vesting of such power in the
leadership brought about the opportunity for investment-type
behavior. Party leadership had the resources to pay for invest-
ment votes. Payments could be made in terms of helping the
investor obtain the chairmanship of a subcommittee. The substi-
tution of party leadership as a vehicle in effecting or granting
promotion for seniority created a demand for investment votes.
It is important to note that party leaders may not demand
investment votes from every party member at every possible
opportunity. We assert that the demand for investment votes
depends on the two factors we have identified as critical in the
development of the investment market: the representative's sen-
iority and the representative's probability of re-election. Consis-
tent with our discussion of supply factors, we suggest that the
demand for investment votes will tend to be stronger during the
middle years of the congressional career. It is during this period
that legislators establish a reputation that allows them to deviate
from the immediate interest of their constituents. Leaders will
be cognizant that demanding an investment vote from a repre-
sentative either "too early" in the representative's congressional
career, or when the representative faces a tough challenger, will
be too costly for the leadership, since they risk losing control of
the House if too many incumbents are defeated. This implies that
the demand for investment votes from junior representatives and
from those representatives who expect tough challenges at the
62 Of course, logrolling could have occurred. For a general discussion of logrolling,
see generally Bruce Bender & John R. Lott, Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 87 PUB. CHOICE 67 (1996) (reviewing the literature on
congressional voting behavior).
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polls is lower than the corresponding demand from senior rep-
resentatives or from those representatives who enjoy a high
probability of re-election.
4. Summary
Our model predicts that reverse-investment (i.e., voting with
the constituency) occurs predominantly at the early stages of a
representative's career. This is true both before and after the
reforms of the 1970s. Second, pre-reform investment in favor of
the leadership is not expected to have been prevalent since sen-
iority was the vehicle by which a representative moved up the
congressional hierarchy. Following the reforms, however, we
should observe investment behavior in favor of the leadership.
In particular, investment is more likely to occur in the middle
stages of a representative's tenure, while reverse-investment is
expected to occur at the earlier and later stages.
I. EMPIRICAL TEST
A. Sample and Data
To test the investment model we need to identify situations in
which the representative's two constraints (i.e., the constituents
back home and the party leadership in Congress) take markedly
distinguishable positions (i.e., liberal versus conservative) on
policy issues. Based on the model, no investment occurs when
the policy views of the constituency are in line with those of the
party leadership. During the period under study, the Democratic
Party was in control of the House. We thus focused on Demo-
cratic representatives.
Given our model, investment behavior is expected in situ-
ations in which Democratic representatives from relatively con-
servative districts face a relatively liberal party leadership. In
such cases investment behavior could be empirically identified,
since the party leaders are likely to take political positions that
are opposite to the positions taken by the representative's respec-
tive constituencies on a variety of policy issues. As suggested
by our model, investment votes will only be observed in the
post-reform period, and only during the middle years of the
representative's career. Thus, in order to test the model, we limit
1998]
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our sample to those Democratic representatives who are rela-
tively conservative; that is, we include in the sample only those
Democrats whose districts voted for the Republican candidate
for president and whose Americans for Democratic Action
("ADA") scores are less than those of their party's congressional
leaders. 63
We use the ADA ratings to create our dependent variable.64
Our interest is to develop a measure that allows us to capture
the relationship between a legislator's voting behavior and the
preferences of that legislator's two principals: the party leader-
ship and the constituents back home. For this purpose, we em-
ploy the variable ADAD, defined as, ADAD = ADAlader- ADAi,
where ADAeader is the ADA score of the majority leader for a
given year,65 and ADAi is the representative's ADA score for the
same year.
Given our sample (i.e., Democratic representatives facing some-
what conservative constituents) ADAD has the following inter-
pretation. The larger the ADAD (i.e., the larger the difference
between a representative's ADA and that of the leader), the more
conservative the representative. A smaller ADAD means that the
representative is voting more in line with the party leadership,
thus taking more liberal positions.
We measure tenure as the number of years the representative
has been in Congress. To capture the marginal effect of time, we
create three variables based on the representative's tenure. We
refer to these as TENURE1, TENURE2, and TENURE3, and
they are defined as follows: 66
63The ADA is commonly used in studies of congressional behavior. See, e.g., Barry
R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?:
Regulatory Policy-Making by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcON. 765,
783-96 (1983). The ADA rating is an index calculated for each representative by the
Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal interest group. The rating shows the
percentage of the legislator's votes in a selected sample that are considered liberal as
defined by the Americans for Democratic Action.64The dependent (or exogenous) variable represents the event or events that are
explained by the model. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & JOHN E. JACKSON, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 3 (1977).
65For the periods under analysis, the House majority leaders were John W. McCor-
mack (1961), Carl Albert (1962-71), Hale Boggs (1971-73), Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
(1973-77), and Jim Wright (1978-80). See MEMBERS, supra note 51, at 179.
66For a similar treatment, see Randall Morck, et al., Management Ownership and
Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 298 (1988). The authors analyzed the effect
of equity ownership by management of private firms on firm performance. Ownership
concentration was divided into three classes: companies in which management owned
up to 5%, between 5% and 25%, and above 25%.
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For the 1960s:
TENURE1 = tenure if tenure < 9.45 years,
= 9.45 if tenure > 9.45 years;
TENURE2 = 0 if tenure < 9.45 years,
= tenure minus 9.45 if 9.45 < tenure < 21 years,
= 11.55 if tenure > 21 years;
TENURE3 = 0 if tenure < 21 years,
= tenure minus 21 if tenure > 21 years;
For the 1970s:
TENURE1 = tenure if tenure < 6.09 years,
= 6.09 if tenure >_ 6.09 years;
TENURE2 = 0 if tenure < 6.09 years,
= tenure minus 6.09 if 6.09 < tenure < 20.5 years,
= 14.41 if tenure L 20.5 years;
TENURE3 = 0 if tenure < 20.5 years,
= tenure minus 20.5 if tenure 20.5 years;
For example, a representative whose tenure was 23 years in
1974, TENURE1 = 6.09; TENURE2 = 14.41; and TENURE3
= 2.5.
The rationale for using these specific thresholds (i.e., 9.45 and
21 for the 1960s; 6.09 and 20.5 for the 1970s) is to capture the
different "turning points" in a representative's career. An indica-
tor of this career path is the transition from being a junior
member of a subcommittee to becoming a chair of a subcom-
mittee and then moving into chairing a committee. Such a pro-
gression, we argue, indicates a change in the status of the rep-
resentative in terms of her power in influencing policy outcomes. 67
The thresholds are calculated as the average number of years of
service prior to obtaining a subcommittee chair for those indi-
viduals obtaining a subcommittee chair for the first time (e.g.,
9.45 years in the 1960s, 6.09 years in the 1970s) or a committee
chair (e.g., 21 years in the 1960s, 20.5 years in the 1970s).68
To capture the safety margin factor, we include the variable
SAFETY. SAFETY is measured as the margin of victory the
incumbent experienced on the prior congressional election. The
67
see, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 171
(1991) (stating that there is strong empirical support for the relationship between
committee service and policy expertise).68See SMITH & DEERING, supra note 35, at 191-92.
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variable SAFETY is interacted with the three variables repre-
senting years of service (TENURE1, TENURE2 and TENURE3)
to measure the total effect of years of service and safety margins
on the investment variable.
We also examine the effect on voting behavior of the "pres-
tige" of the committee on which the representative served over
the periods being analyzed. It is conventionally accepted that
there are differences in committee attractiveness. 69 For example,
some comnuittees are in an ideal position to shape important
policy issues, are subject to a large degree of exposure, or place
the chair in a strategic position vis-A-vis other members of Con-
gress. 70 We expect that the more important the committee on
which the representative wishes to serve, the greater the repre-
sentative's propensity to invest, all else constant. Representatives
who have already obtained a position on their "ideal" committee
are expected to make less investment than those who wish to
transfer to a more important committee. We focus on voluntary
committee transfers (i.e., a departure from one committee to
accept a seat on another committee) as a way to proxy the
"value" or desirability of a given committee assignment to a
given group of representatives. 71 Transfers are used as a measure
of committee prestige. 72
Finally, we include in the model a set of other variables nor-
mally used in congressional voting research to control for both
the economic and ideological preferences of the constituents. 73
These variables are intended to empirically capture the effect of other
69 See id. at 89 (stating that Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means are among
the elite committees in the House).70See Charles S. Bullock III, Committee Transfers in the United States House of
Representatives, 35 J. POLITICS 85, 92 (1973).
71 See generally id. (studying the relationship between reassignment and tenure,
prestige, seniority, electoral security, and constituency).
72prestige is calculated as:
PREST = Number of transfers to Committee X
Number of transfers to Committee X +
Number of transfers from Committee X
Suppose we are interested in computing the prestige of Committee X from the
perspective of Southern Democrats in a given Congress. Holding the size of the
committee constant, prestige is computed by the ratio of the number of Southern
Democrats who transferred to the committee to the sum of the number of Southern
Democrats who transferred to the committee and the number of Southern Democrats
who left the committee. If, for example, two southern Democrats transferred to the
committee during a given Congress but only one southern Democrat left the committee,
the prestige of the committee to southern Democrats would be .67.
73See Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J. LAw &
ECON. 181, 189 (1984) (listing variables of median family income, median education,
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characteristics of the representative's constituency. These charac-
teristics are likely to affect the policy preferences of the constitu-
ency, and thus, the voting behavior of the individual legislator.74
B. Empirical Model and Results
Our theory suggests that following the institutional reforms of
the early 1970s, a market for investment votes was created. This
implies that investment type behavior should be observed there-
after, but not before. Having constituents as their only con-
straint, representatives during this period will "vote their dis-
trict" systematically regardless of their seniority.
With the reforms, however, we should begin to observe behavior
consistent with investment type voting. Reverse-investment should
occur during the TENUREl period, as newly elected legislators
tend to vote with their constituents to maximize their chance of
re-election. The marked contrast between the 1960s and the
1970s can be observed when examining the total effect of tenure,
safety, and prestige on the dependent variable, ADAD. 75 Our model
predicts that early on, and taking the margin of safety into
consideration, representatives should be more likely to vote with
their constituents. Representatives in their midterm, on the other
hand, will be likely to invest by siding with the leaders. Once
the legislators' tenure increases up to the later stages of his or
her congressional career (empirically captured in our model as the
TENURE3 period), we should expect a revival of voting behav-
ior toward constituents. The effect of tenure on voting behavior
should also be affected by the probability of re-election.
To test this model we used a conventional linear regression
methodology.76 The results are reported in the Appendix. In gen-
percentage of population over 65, percentage of black residents, percentage of those
residing in urban areas, and the share of the labor force employed in manufacturing).
74 Our analysis includes the following variables: INCOME (median family income);
PERCC (percentage of the district's population living in urban areas); PERUN (per-
centage of the state's labor force that is unionized); PERBLACK (percentage of the
district's population that is black); YEDU (median years of education of the district's
population); FARM (percentage of the district's population involved in farming); OIL
(state's per capita revenue in the oil industry); DOD (Department of Defense federal
monetary outlays by state); and COAL (state's per capita revenue in the coal industry).
751n terms of our empirical model,
TENUREi + TENUREi*SAFETY + TENUREi*PREST, where i = 1, 2, or 3.76The regression is of the form, ADADi = c + dXi +g.It, where, ADADi is the
difference between the leader's ADA score and the representative's ADA score; X is a
vector of independent variables; and, [Li is the error term.
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eral, the results are quite supportive of the theory. In the 1960s
there is no evidence of investment behavior. The total effects of
the years of service and safety variables are all insignificant. 77
These results indicate that investment behavior did not occur
during the 1960s.
The results for the 1970s (column 2) are much different than
those for the pre-reform period. As expected, the total effect of
years of service and safety early in the representative's career is
positive and highly significant. 78 The overall effect during the
middle years of congressional service is negative and significant. 79
Compared to the results for the 1960s, the effect of the commit-
tee reforms of the early 1970s is apparent. The negative and
significant effect during the mid-career years is consistent with
the prediction of our investment model. Legislators at the second
stage of their careers are in a position to be selected by the
leadership for promotion to higher positions, such as chairing a
subcommittee. In the post-reforms era, competition among leg-
islators in mid-career is expected to have been intense. Whether
those legislators invested, and whether the leaders demanded,
such votes probably depended on the effect that the investment
votes had on the chances of re-election.
The effect of tenure and safety on legislators late in their
careers is less certain.80 However, compared to the voting behav-
ior during the second stage, representatives in the last stage of
their careers do not necessarily side with party leaders.
A major proposition of our theory is that while safety margins
matter, as has been evidenced in prior research,81 they matter in
a particular way. For example, they matter in the context of the
77To determine the effect of tenure and safety in voting behavior we calculated the
following equations:
1* = bTENURi + (bTENUREi.SAFEr (XsApa'Y + bTENUREiMPREST(XPRES
and,
SB* = [Var(bTENURVi) + X 2 * Var(bTENUREi*SAFT ) + X2 * Var(bTENUREI.PREST)
+ 2 Cov (bTENUREi , bTENUREP*SAFESTI
+ 2 Coy (bTENUREi , bTENUREi*PRST)]I 2.
The coefficient for the total effect during the first period of the representative's career
is -.38, with a standard error of 1.23. The coefficient for total effect during the middle
years is .8, with a standard error of .92. The coefficient of the total effect during the
last period is -1.1, with a standard error of 1.3.
78 Using the formula described in supra note 76, the coefficient equals 2.76, and the
standard error equals .68.
79Using the formula described in supra note 76, the coefficient equals -.65, and the
standard error equals .24.
8oUsing the formula described in supra note 76, the coefficient equals .91, and the
standard error equals .52.
81 See generally Alford & Hibbing, supra note 13, passim.
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congressional career. Once we account for the interaction effect
of tenure and safety margins, the effect of SAFETY is insig-
nificant in both specifications.
The variable PREST, which measures the "importance" or
"prestige" of the committee on which a representative serves,
appears to have had no effect on the voting behavior of repre-
sentatives during either the 1960s or the 1970s. The interaction
between PREST and TENURE is significant during the post-re-
form period, but insignificant in the 1960s. During the 1970s,
the interaction term PREST*TENURE is negative and sig-
nificant earlier in the representative's career but positive and
significant during the mid-years of the individual congressional
career. In other words, early on in the representative's career, the
higher the importance of the committee upon which he or she
serves, the closer the representative's voting behavior is to the
leader's voting behavior, all else being constant. In the middle
period, however, the higher the prestige of the committee on
which the representative serves, the more likely the repre-
sentative is to vote with his or her constituents and against the
leadership.
We conducted further analysis to determine whether the re-
sults support the proposition that different voting patterns were
developing during the different periods. That is, not only did we
ask whether the voting behavior varied among representatives
within the two time periods, but whether it also varied from one
time period to the next. This question amounts to testing whether
the reforms had any significant effect.8 2
82We test whether the coefficients of the tenure variables are also statistically
different from each other. T-tests of the difference between the tenure coefficients were
conducted. Notice that the standard errors are in parentheses.
1961-68 1973-78
TENURE1 -.05 2.63**
-TENURE2 (2.36) (1.37)
TENUREl 1.45 2.98***
-TENURE3 (2.87) (1.10)
TENURE2 1.5 .35
-TENURE3 (3.57) (1.08)
The test statistic is calculated as I*/sB., where, B* = TENURE1 - TENURE2, and
So. = [Var(TENUREI) + Var(TENURE2) - 2 Cov(TENURE1, TENURE2)]1\2.
All tests are two-tail. ** Significant at the .10 level (.05,.01).
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The results of these further tests show that, for the 1960s, none
of the differences between the coefficients of the various tenure
variables is statistically significant. These statistics illustrate that,
as expected, throughout the 1960s leadership was not a con-
straint during the middle years of the representative's career.
Consistent with our investment model, the results depict that,
unlike the 1960s, leadership was a constraint in the 1970s. This
constraint became binding during the middle years of the repre-
sentative's career.83
III. EVALUATING THE 1995 RULES CHANGES:
A HISTORY LESSON
Our analysis leads us to two major conclusions. First, the rules
changes matter. The movement away from a system based on
seniority created an opportunity for an investment market to
develop. By moving away from a seniority-based system, new
mechanisms had to be created to maintain party unity. The dis-
tribution of important committee seats and committee chairs
became one such mechanism. This, in turn, led to the creation
of a market for "trading" these political favors. Second, the
effects of the rules changes are filtered in the context of the
congressional career. Not all representatives responded equally
to the changes being introduced, neither were they in positions
to provide the same degree of support for the leadership. While
representatives in the middle point of their careers were in a
position to engage in investment behavior, junior representatives
were not.
How do these two results relate to the more recent changes
enacted by the Republican majority in the House? We argue that
83Finally, using the results of Table 1, we also test whether the tenure variables'
coefficients for the 1960s (pre-reform) are significantly different from the coefficients
of the 1970s (post-reforms). F-tests were conducted comparing similar models across
the two periods. The resulting F-statistics for all the models are statistically significant
at the .01 level. These results indicate that it is incorrect to assume that the coefficients
across specifications are equal, i.e., two different regressions must be estimated. The
test is of the form:
(ESSR - ESSup)/k
Fk,N+M-2k =
ESSup! (N + M - 2k)
where k = number of restrictions; N + M = number of observations; ESSR =
Restricted residual sum of squares; and ESSUR = Unrestricted residual sum of squares.
See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND
ECONOMIC FORECASTS 116 (3d ed. 1991). The F-statistic is 2.42.
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there are at least two points of comparison. First, it seems that
Speaker Gingrich was paying attention to the rule changes of the
1970s when implementing his recent reforms. For instance, the
Speaker appears to have realized that party loyalty and unity were
not free goods, but benefits for which party leaders must pay.
The allegiance of party members comes at a price. That price is
measured in terms of the allocation of resources over which the
leadership has control. This explains, we argue, why the reform
limiting the number of subcommittees was accompanied by the
rule change that imposed term limits on committee and subcom-
mittee chairs. Something has to be offered to party members for
their loyalty. Thus, while reducing the number of subcommittees
and accordingly decreasing the numbers of immediate positions
of leadership available, the term limits created future opportuni-
ties for more members to have a chance at becoming chairmen.
While this tradeoff of numbers of subcommittees and term
limits provided the structure for maintaining some leadership
control, it was certainly not enough. To provide the leadership
with more leverage, leaders took a more active approach in the
distribution of resources. The Speaker put himself on the line by
becoming actively involved in the distribution of chair positions
and the allocation of committee seats. In this process, the Re-
publican leadership appears to have been cognizant of the rele-
vance of the congressional career effect and the electoral safety
factors affecting a representative's ability to support party lead-
ership. As described earlier, the party leadership was sensitive
to the idiosyncrasies of particular members' constituencies when
allocating committee seats and making chair appointments.
A final question raised by our analysis relates to the effect of
missing pieces. Unlike 1970s amendments, which created a sys-
tem of incentives independent of any one individual, the 1995
changes are highly dependent on the Speaker himself. Without
Speaker Gingrich's intrusion into the allocation of the leadership
resources, and past the initial 100 days' agenda, it is not clear
that there are enough incentives to keep members in line with
the party's position. Indeed, congressional observers have al-
ready pointed out that there has been a reversion to the pre-1995
reforms in Congress, at least with respect to the redistribution
of power to committee chairs.8 4 Our analysis suggests that the
84 See Jackie Koszczuk, A Full Circle, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 9, 9 (Supp. Mar. 22,
1997).
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institutional factors that affect congressional voting behavior are
nontrivial and likely to survive the personalities of particular
individuals, even that of Speaker Gingrich.
CONCLUSION
This Article contributes to the literature on congressional vot-
ing behavior by developing a model of voting behavior which
includes investment as a nontrivial component. By comparing
the costs and benefits of a given course of action, and incorpo-
rating the effect of investment in the assessment of these costs,
the model predicts specific and nontrivial changes in voting be-
havior corresponding to changes in tenure. Further, the model
considers the effects on voting behavior of institutional changes
in Congress that occurred during the 1970s, and analyzes the
effects of the changes on the voting behavior of individual rep-
resentatives.
The results presented in this Article are not only of historical
interest, but also, we argue, provide a context against which we
can evaluate the implications of the recent changes enacted by
the Republican Congress in 1995.
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APPENDIX
LINEAR REGRESSION-DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ADAD
(S.E. in Parentheses)
1961-68 1973-80
INTERCEPT 96.54*** 76.36***
(20.84) (14.31)
TENURE1 -.91 2.59***
(1.31) (.95)
TENURE2 -.86 -.04
(1.41) (.50)
TENURE3 -2.36 1.39
(2.66) (.73)
TENUREI*SAFETY -2.57 4.99***
(2.49) (2.13)
TENURE2*SAFETY 4.20* -3.17***
(2.27) (1.04)
TENURE3*SAFETY -1.90 3.10***
(3.20) (1.19)
SAFETY 23.33 -2.16
(15.29) (8.92)
PREST -13.91 8.65
(11.90) (5.99)
PREST*TENURE1 2.83 -3.82***
(2.00) (1.37)
PREST*TENURE2 -.70 1.47***
(1.73) (.56)
PREST*TENURE3 3.46 -.41**
(2.78) (.64)
INCOME .002 -.003***
(.002) (.0006)
PERCC -.02 -.05*
(.12) (.03)
PERUN -1.14*** -.47***
(.17) (.09)
PERBLACK .09 .19**
(.10) (.07)
YEDU -5.75*** .26
(1.92) (.89)
FARM -.0001"* -.12
(.00005) (.07)
AGE .83 -.56**
(.53) (.22)
OIL -.002 .004***
(.002) (.0009)
DOD .0007 -.00004
(.0004) (.002)
COAL -.05** -.01
(.03) (.01)
R2  .35 .44
N 304 612
All tests are two-tail. *, (**, ***) Significant at the .10 (.05, .01) level.
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